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Getting What You Ask For:  Barriers to Proper Use of Service 
Monitoring Tools 
 
Abstract:  This paper provides a greater understanding of the contract monitoring 
process by identifying barriers that prevent contracted providers from using service 
monitoring tools properly.  To evaluate barriers to proper tool use, seven case studies 
were conducted on early childhood programs in three communities in Upstate New York.  
The case studies specifically focused on the reporting forms that the early childhood 
programs completed.  Data sources included:  (1) interviews with government agency and 
contracted provider employees, (2) content analysis of key documents relating to the 
service monitoring tools, and (3) attendance at meetings between government agencies 
and contracted providers on the service monitoring tools.  This paper identifies lack of 
contracted provider ability and misunderstandings between government and contracted 
providers as key barriers to proper tool use.  This paper also finds evidence suggesting a 
link between the overall strength of technical assistance systems and understanding 
problems.  
Keywords:  contracting out, contract monitoring, social services, privatization  
 
Many public services are not directly delivered by public organizations.  Instead, 
public organizations contract with private organizations to deliver a wide variety of 
public services (Behn & Kaht, 1999; Donahue, 1989; Kettl, 1993, 2000; Savas, 1987, 
2000; Sclar, 2000).  Everything from garbage collection (Brown & Potoski, 2004) to the 
production of nuclear weapons (Kettl, 1993) has been contracted out.  Contracting out for 
social services is particularly common (Kettl, 1993; Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Van Slyke, 
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2002),  Reflecting this, government support of social service agencies increased by 200% 
from 1977 to 1997 (Salamon, 2002).  As a result of contracting out, the role of 
government is gradually shifting from service deliverer to contract manager.   
This transformation has created what Kettl (1993) refers to as the “smart buyer” 
challenge for government.  In order to be a smart buyer, a government agency must 
know: (1) what service it wants to buy, (2) who it wants to buy the service from, and (3) 
the quality of what it has purchased.  This paper examines one dimension of the smart 
buyer challenge:  situations in which the government is monitoring contracted providers 
based at least in part on information that contracted providers are collecting.  Hereafter, 
the information sources collected by contracted providers are referred to as service 
monitoring tools.  This paper defines a service monitoring tool very broadly as any 
source of information used by a government agency to monitor service inputs, outputs, 
and/or outcomes that a contracted provider is required to give to a government agency as 
a condition of a government contract.1  As an example of a service monitoring tool, this 
study focused on reporting forms that early childhood programs in three communities in 
Upstate New York were required by government agencies to complete. 
Considerable research indicates that government agencies often lack the capacity 
to adequately monitor contracted providers themselves (GAO, 1997; Kettl, 1993, 2000; 
Milward, Provan, & Else, 1993; Van Slyke, 2003).  For example, Cigler (1990) reports 
that nearly two-thirds of North Carolina county officials completing her survey on 
contracting out practices cited the “difficulty in monitoring the performance of 
                                                 
1 There is a burgeoning literature on performance contracting (Behn & Kant, 1999; Blasi, 2002; Kettner & 
Martin, 1995; Martin, 2000; Martin, 2002).  However, the broader term service monitoring tool is used in 
this study rather than performance monitoring tool because many of the government agencies included in 
this study only collected information on contracted providers’ service inputs and outputs and did not 
attempt to evaluate service outcomes or the quality of services contracted providers were delivering. 
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contractors” as the “greatest disadvantage with contracting experienced by their 
government” (p. 293).  As a result of this lack of capacity to monitor contracted 
providers, government officials often rely on data collected by contracted providers as 
key sources of information (Brown & Potoski, 2006; DeHoog, 1984; Kettl, 1993; Smith 
& Lipsky, 1993).  A contracted provider is properly using a service monitoring tool when 
the contracted provider reports the data collected by this tool in a timely manner and 
when the data are both accurate and complete.  
Contracted providers' use of service monitoring tools has significant 
consequences for the contract monitoring process.  The government agency can use the 
information from a service monitoring tool to assess to what extent the services being 
delivered are aligned with contractual provisions and the government’s service delivery 
goals.   The government agency can also use information provided by a service 
monitoring tools to make better informed future contracting decisions.  When used in 
these ways, service monitoring tools represent an important mechanism for holding 
contracted providers accountable for the services that they are delivering.   
Despite implications for contract monitoring and accountability, the conditions 
under which a contracted provider will properly use a service monitoring tool have not 
been well studied.  This paper provides a greater understanding of the contract 
monitoring process and offers insight into the processes through which public agencies 
obtain information from contracted providers in privatized environments.  Using 
expectancy theory as its “research frame” (Stoecker, 1991), this paper identifies barriers 
that prevent contracted providers from using service monitoring tools properly.  To 
examine these barriers, seven case studies were conducted on early childhood programs 
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in three communities in Upstate New York.  The case studies specifically focused on the 
reporting forms that the early childhood programs completed.  This paper concludes by 
discussing some implications of this study’s findings for public administrators as well as 
areas for further research.   
Accountability in Contracting Relationships 
The relationship between a government agency and a contracted provider 
represents a classic principal-agent relationship in which the government is the principal 
and the contracted provider is the agent.  Agents can behave opportunistically (Barney & 
Hesterly, 1999; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  In particular, problems can 
arise with principal-agent relationships when the goals of the principal and agent conflict 
and when it is difficult and costly for the principal to monitor the activities of the agent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  The sources of these problems are related to adverse selection and 
moral hazard (Arrow, 1984).  
Given the potential of contracted providers behaving opportunistically, several 
scholars have stressed the importance of accountability in the contracting out literature 
(Blasi, 2002; Breaux, Duncan, & Keller, 2002; Coats, 2002; Dicke, 2002; Johnston & 
Romzek, 1999; Klingner, Nalbandian, & Romzek, 2002; Ott & Dicke, 2000; Romzek & 
Johnston, 2005).  Contracting out further complicates the complex web of overlapping 
accountability relationships that exist in public administration (Klingner, Nalbandian, & 
Romzek, 2002).  Work by Johnston & Romzek (1999) and Romzek & Johnston (2005) 
highlights three types of accountability as being particularly salient in contracting 
relationships:  (1) legal accountability which focuses on the external monitoring of 
contractual compliance, (2) political accountability which focuses on the responsiveness 
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of key stakeholders, and (3) professional accountability which focuses on deference to 
professional norms and practices.   
Service monitoring tools represent one of several ways governments can hold 
contracted providers accountable for the services they deliver.  Public administrators can 
use both internal and external mechanisms in an effort to ensure contracted provider 
accountability (Dicke, 2002).  As an internal mechanism, trust can play a critical role in 
ensuring accountability in contracting relationships (Beineke & DeFillippi, 1999; Bennett 
& Ferlie, 1996; Ott & Dicke, 2000; Sclar, 2000; Smith, 1996; Smith & Smyth, 1996; Van 
Slyke, 2007).  The most basic external mechanism for ensuring contracted provider 
accountability is carefully detailing contract terms and conditions (Brown, Potoski, & 
Van Slyke, 2006).  However, it is often impossible for parties to foresee all possible 
scenarios that may arise in a contracting relationship.  As a result, most contracts do not 
specify all of the different contracting contingencies that may occur and are "incomplete" 
(Battigalli & Maggi, 2002; Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006; Milgrom & Roberts, 
1992; Tirole, 1999).  As an alternative external control mechanism, government agencies 
can offer incentives to reward good contracted provider performance (Behn & Kant, 
1999; Blasi, 2002; Kettner & Martin, 1995; Martin, 2000, 2002).  With performance 
contracting, contracted provider compensation and retention of the contract may be 
linked to contracted provider performance.   
Another common external mechanism for ensuring contracted provider 
accountability is contract monitoring (Dicke, 2002).  By examining contracted providers’ 
use of service monitoring tools, this article contributes to the small but growing literature 
on the contract monitoring process (Brown & Potoski, 2004, 2006; Romzek & Johnston, 
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2002).  Recent research has examined government reliance on contracted providers to 
collect data on their own performance as a substitute for direct monitoring by government 
managers (Brown & Potoski, 2006).  However, little is known about the barriers that 
prevent contracted providers from using service monitoring tools properly, the focus of 
this article.  The next section develops a theoretical framework for understanding barriers 
to proper tool use. 
Barriers to Proper Tool Use 
As previously defined, a contracted provider is properly using a service 
monitoring tool when the contracted provider reports the data collected by this tool in a 
timely manner and when the data is both accurate and complete.  This paper draws on 
expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964; Porter & Lawler, 1968) and its general framework for 
understanding performance in organizations to identify potential barriers to proper tool 
use.2  In the context of this study, the type of performance being considered is the extent 
to which a contracted provider properly uses a service monitoring tool.  While 
expectancy theorists primarily focus on the determinants of motivation,3 they also 
recognize the impact of other factors on performance.  According to expectancy theory, 
motivation, ability, and understanding determine performance (Porter & Lawler, 1968).4  
This framework has been used to understand other public sector issues such as 
                                                 
2 The earliest version of expectancy theory presented by Vroom (1964) focuses on need-based outcomes 
and is tied more directly to content-based theories of motivation.  However, later versions of the model 
such as the framework presented by Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, and Weick (1970) view performance as 
an outcome, examining motivation as a process.  The description of expectancy theory presented in this 
study is consistent with this latter approach.   
3 According to expectancy theory, the interactions among three different beliefs determine motivation to 
perform:  expectancy, instrumentality, and valence of rewards (Vroom, 1964; Porter & Lawler, 1968).   
4 In this study, the more intuitive term “understanding” is substituted for the term role perception used by 
Porter & Lawler (1968). 
 7
collaborative efforts of citizens and public officials to provide public services (Powers & 
Thompson, 1994). 
A variety of theories have guided past studies on contracting out including public 
choice theory (Cohen, 2001; Kelman, 2002; Savas, 1987), principal-agent theory (Coats, 
2002; Breaux, Duncan, & Keller, 2002; Stein, 1990; Van Slyke, 2007), transaction cost 
economics (Brown & Potoski, 2006; Domberger, 1998; Sclar, 2000), resource 
dependency (Graddy & Chen, 2006; Heimovics, Herman, & Jurkiewicz, 1993; Saidel, 
1991), and new institutionalism (Brown & Potoski, 2003).  Expectancy theory has not 
been applied in a contracting out context.  This study expands the theoretical base of the 
contracting out literature and provides an additional lens for understanding the 
phenomenon of contracting out.  Expectancy theory was selected as the principal theory 
guiding this study because a broad framework on organizational performance was needed 
to understand contracted providers’ use of service monitoring tools.  
Applying expectancy theory, three factors determine a contracted provider’s 
proper use of a service monitoring tool:  contracted provider motivation, contracted 
provider ability, and government and contracted provider understanding.  Figure 1 details 
three different barriers to a contracted provider using a service monitoring tool properly.  
The first barrier is when the contracted provider knows how and is able to use the service 
monitoring tool properly but is not interested in doing so.  In this circumstance, there is a 
motivation barrier.  For example, a contracted provider may believe it will receive future 
contracts with the government if it properly uses a service monitoring tool.  However, the 
contracted provider may not place a high value on receiving these future contracts 
because the revenue that it will receive is very small compared to the rest of the 
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organization’s budget.  As a result, the contracted provider may not be motivated to use 
the service monitoring tool properly under these conditions. 
Figure 1.  Barriers to Contracted Provider Proper Tool Usage 
 
 
 
 
 
Even though a contracted provider is willing to use a service monitoring tool the 
way it thinks that the government agency wants it to use the tool, this does not guarantee 
that the contracted provider will use the tool properly.  The contracted provider may be 
unable to use the tool properly due to either lack of resources or skill.  Improper use in 
this case involves an ability barrier.  As an example, contracted provider staff may need 
to be knowledgeable about specific accounting practices in order to be able to properly 
complete financial statements required by the government as a condition of a contract.  If 
the contracted provider lacks these accounting skills, it is not going to be able to properly 
complete the forms. 
Finally, the contracted provider’s understanding of what proper tool use is may 
not match the government agency’s intentions on how the tool should be used.  This type 
of improper use occurs when there is a good faith misunderstanding about what proper 
tool usage entails.  This is referred to as an understanding barrier.  For instance, the 
government may want the contracted provider to include both clients currently enrolled in 
the program and clients who have left the program when calculating the percentage of 
clients meeting a particular goal.  On the other hand, the contracted provider may think 
they should just be basing their calculations on clients currently enrolled in the program.  
Motivation Barrier:  A contracted provider is not interested in properly using a service monitoring tool. 
 
Ability Barrier:  A contracted provider is unable to use a service monitoring tool properly. 
 
Understanding Barrier:  A contracted provider’s understanding of what proper tool use is does not match 
how the government intended the contracted provider to use the tool.   
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In this case, the government intends one thing but the contracted provider unknowingly 
does another.  Technical assistance plays an important role in contracting relationships 
(Romzek & Johnston, 1999) and can help reduce understanding problems between the 
government and contracted providers (Gooden, 1998).  By providing technical assistance 
on proper tool use, the government agency can supplement the information on proper tool 
use specified in the contract and clarify potential misunderstandings.   
Research Design 
This paper examines possible barriers to proper tool usage employing a case study 
design.  Specifically, seven different case studies were conducted on service monitoring 
tools that early childhood programs in three counties in Upstate New York were required 
by government agencies to complete.  Hereafter, these counties are referred to as 
Communities A, B, and C.  Table 1 provides basic demographic information on the three 
communities.   
Table 1.  Basic Demographic Information from 2000 Census by Community 
 Community A Community B Community C 
% white (county) 85% 97% 88% 
% white (city) 64% 96% 77% 
% individuals below 
poverty level (county) 
12% 16% 11% 
% individuals below 
poverty level (city) 
27% 25% 21% 
% speaks a language 
other than English at 
home (county) 
9% 4% 10% 
% speaks a language 
other than English at 
home (city) 
13% 6% 13% 
Urban/rural (county) Primarily urban Half urban/half rural Primarily urban 
 
In an effort to increase this study’s generalizability, multi-site case studies were 
conducted (Schofield, 2000).  Three of the seven case studies focused on service 
monitoring tools that the county’s city school district in Communities A, B, and C 
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required contracted providers receiving universal pre-kindergarten (UPK) funds to 
complete.  Another three of the seven case studies focused on service monitoring tools 
that the county Department of Social Services (DSS) in Communities A, B, and C 
required contracted providers receiving day care services funds to complete.  The final of 
the seven case studies focused on service monitoring tools that the Administration for 
Children and Families required Head Start grantees to complete.  The UPK and DSS 
programs were local programs so the reporting forms contracted providers were 
completing were unique to each community.  On the other hand, Head Start is a federal 
program so the Head Start reporting forms contracted providers were completing were 
the same in the three communities.  In instances in which a government agency reported 
that contracted providers were required to complete multiple reporting forms, the case 
studies focused on forms providing information on the services contracted providers were 
delivering.   
The information about contracted provider service provision collected on the 
different reporting forms examined as part of this study varied considerably.  The DSS 
reporting forms that this study focused were similar across the three counties and 
included information on children’s attendance and providers’ calculations of the amount 
of money the county owed them based on children’s attendance.  Contracted providers 
submitted these forms on a monthly basis in each case.   Each of the UPK case studies as 
well as the Head Start case study focused on the individual assessments of children’s 
skills that contracted providers were required to complete.   There was a wide variation in 
the content covered on the different assessments.   The individual assessments of 
children’s skills were completed three times per year for Community A’s UPK program, 
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two times per year for Community B’s UPK program and the Head Start program, and 
one time per year for Community C’s UPK program.  In addition to the individual 
assessments of children’s skills, this study focused on other forms that contracted 
providers were required to complete for the UPK programs in Communities A and C and 
the Head Start program.  As part of the case studies on the UPK programs in 
Communities A and C, the attendance forms that contracted providers were required to 
complete were examined.  The case study on Community C’s UPK program also 
examined a semi-annual report on contracted provider achievement of program goals.  
The Program Information Report (PIR) was the other reporting requirement examined as 
part of the Head Start case study.  This report was completed annually and provided a 
wide array of information on program design, staffing, enrollment, and services.   
One of the key reasons that this study focused on UPK, Head Start, and county 
DSS day care services programs relates to the structure of UPK programs in New York.  
New York school districts with UPK programs must allocate at least 10% of the state 
funds they receive for this service to contracting with community agencies.  Many 
community agencies receiving UPK funds also receive funding from Head Start or their 
county DSS office, two other common funding sources for early childhood programs.  As 
a result, several of the contracted providers participating in this study were monitored by 
multiple government agencies and were required to use multiple service monitoring tools.  
Also as social service agencies, the early childhood programs this study focuses on 
provided an interesting setting for examining this paper’s research question.  Social 
services is a policy area where contracting out is prevalent (Kettl, 1993; Smith & Lipsky, 
1993; Van Slyke, 2002), and government reliance on contracted providers as its main 
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source of information on contracted provider performance is common (DeHoog, 1984; 
Kettl, 1993; Smith & Lipsky, 1993).   
 Selection of Communities A, B, and C was based on a review of UPK reporting 
forms from eight city school districts in Upstate New York.  The required UPK reporting 
in these three communities was representative of the variation in the amount and type of 
information that UPK contracted providers in the eight districts were required to collect.  
In order to minimize the potential for confounding factors, research sites from the same 
general geographic area and similar economic conditions were chosen.  This study also 
only focused on reporting forms in one service area, early childhood programs.   
In an effort to triangulate the data, this study relied on several different data 
sources.  The data sources included:  (1) interviews with government agency and 
contracted provider employees, (2) content analysis of key documents relating to 
reporting form completion, and (3) attendance at meetings between government agencies 
and contracted providers on the reporting forms.   
A total of 52 semi-structured interviews were conducted from July 2004 to April 
2005 with employees from seven government agencies and twenty-four contracted 
provider agencies.  At the beginning of each interview, the confidentiality of the 
individual being interviewed was guaranteed.  Average interview length was an hour.  A 
purposive sampling strategy was used to select study participants in order to ensure that 
only individuals familiar with the service monitoring tools that the study focused on were 
interviewed.  
One employee from each of the seven government agencies was interviewed.  
Topics discussed in the interviews with government agency employees included the 
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general contract monitoring environment, instructions for reporting form completion, 
agency use of reporting forms, and consequences relating to data provided on the 
reporting forms.  All of the government agency employees who were interviewed were 
female and held administrative positions within their respective organizations. 
Table 2.  Contracted Provider Funding Sources 
 Community A Community B Community C 
UPK funding only 1 0 2 
DSS funding only 2 3 4 
UPK and DSS funding 4 3 2 
UPK and Head Start 
funding 
1 1 1 
 
Forty-five interviews with employees from contracted providers were also 
conducted.  All of the employees interviewed were involved with the completion of 
service monitoring tools required by at least one of the seven government agencies 
participating in the study.  Table 2 provides a breakdown of contracted provider funding 
sources.  In cases in which a contracted provider received funding from two government 
agencies, separate interviews were conducted about the completion of reporting forms for 
each government agency.  Of the twenty-four contracted provider organizations 
participating in the study, nineteen were non-profits, three were for-profits, and two were 
public colleges.  In total, forty-three contracted provider employees participated in the 
study.5  All but two of these contracted provider employees were female.  Thirteen of the 
contracted provider employees were front-line staff while the remainder was not involved 
with direct service delivery. 
                                                 
5 Some contracted provider employees were interviewed multiple times because they were involved with 
the completion of multiple service monitoring tools.  In a few of the contracted provider interviews, two or 
more employees from the organization participated. 
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The interview protocol with contracted provider employees included questions on 
different reasons that might motivate a contracted provider to properly use a service 
monitoring tool.  In addition, contracted providers were asked to assess their 
organization’s ability to properly complete the reporting forms.  Problems relating to 
understanding were identified in two different ways.  During the contracted provider 
interviews, employees were asked to read instructions on reporting form completion and 
assess how well the instructions matched their understanding of how they should have 
been filling out the reporting forms.  Later in the interview, contracted provider 
employees were asked if they were ever confused about how they should have been 
completing the reporting forms.  The interview protocol with contracted providers also 
included a question on instances in which their organization was unable to fill out the 
reporting forms properly.  Employees were asked which of the following factors 
explained why reporting forms were not filled out properly:  (1) lack of motivation, (2) 
lack of ability, or (3) confusion about what the government agency wanted.   
All interviews with government agency and contracted provider employees were 
taped, transcribed, and coded.  Initial codes were developed based on the government and 
contracted provider interview instruments.  This list of codes was then revised and 
augmented through an inductive process based on analysis of the interview transcripts.  
Detailed definitions of each code were developed in order to ensure consistent usage.  
Memoing was used throughout the coding process (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  Coded 
interview data was then analyzed using QSR Nud*ist v. 4.0.  Pattern-matching was 
employed as part of the data analysis (Yin, 1994). 
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Content analysis on key documents relating to reporting form completion was 
also conducted in all seven of the case studies.  Examples of documents reviewed 
included the reporting forms themselves, instructions on reporting form completion, legal 
contracts between government agencies and contracted providers, training materials, and 
written correspondence.  Data from these documents were used to assess legal contract 
explicitness on reporting form completion, the complexity of reporting form completion, 
and the technical assistance contracted providers received on reporting form completion.  
As a final information source, meetings between government agencies and contracted 
providers on the reporting forms were observed whenever possible.  Field notes from 
these meetings were used to assess the technical assistance contracted providers received 
on reporting form completion.  
Combining data collected from the interviews, content analysis, and fieldnotes, 
the overall strength of a program’s technical assistance system for the reporting forms 
was evaluated.  As part of this assessment, the following four characteristics were 
considered:  (1) whether the government offered training on reporting form completion 
when the forms were first introduced; (2) whether the government organized ongoing 
meetings with contracted providers on the reporting forms; (3) whether the government 
gave contracted providers written instructions on reporting form completion; and (4) 
whether the government’s technical assistance for the reporting forms was accessible to 
contracted providers.  A program that had all of these characteristics was considered to 
have a strong technical assistance system for the reporting forms.  On the other hand, a 
program that lacked many of these elements was considered to have a weak technical 
assistance system.  
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Motivation as a Barrier to Proper Tool Use 
Lack of motivation was not perceived as a barrier to proper tool use.  This finding 
was consistent across all seven case studies regardless of the programming area.  In all 
forty-five of the contracted provider interviews, employees could identify at least one 
factor motivating them to properly complete the reporting forms.  Contracted provider 
employees’ identification of barriers to properly filling out the reporting forms provides 
further evidence that lack of motivation was not perceived as a barrier.  As depicted in 
Table 3, motivation was identified as a barrier to properly filling out the reporting forms 
in only one of the forty-five contracted provider interviews.   
Table 3. Lack of Motivation as a Barrier  
 
Case study  Total number  of case 
study interviews  
Total number (%) of interviews 
citing motivation as a barrier 
Community A:  UPK 10 0 (0%) 
Community A:  DSS 6 0 (0%) 
Community B:  UPK 5 0 (0%) 
Community B:  DSS 6 0 (0%) 
Community C:  UPK 6 0 (0%) 
Community C:  DSS 6 1 (17%) 
Head Start 6 0 (0%) 
Total 45 1 (2%) 
 
Ability as a Barrier to Proper Tool Use 
While lack of motivation was not perceived as a barrier to proper tool use, lack of 
ability was reported as a moderate barrier to proper tool use.  Contracted providers who 
indicated that their organization lacked the ability to fill out the reporting forms properly 
at least one time were classified as experiencing an ability barrier.  Table 4 lists the 
number of interviews broken down by case study in which contracted provider employees 
indicated experiencing specific ability barriers.  The first ability barrier relates to staffing 
issues.  Interviews classified in this category include those in which contracted provider 
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employees reported inadequate staffing, staff turnover, and/or lack of training had 
prevented their organization from properly completing the reporting forms at least one 
time.  The second barrier relates to financial issues.  The third barrier relates to problems 
getting information from the government.  The last column lists the total number of 
interviews in which at least one ability barrier was mentioned.  This column is not a sum 
of the other three because some people cited more than one type of ability barrier.   
Table 4. Lack of Ability as a Barrier  
 
Case study  Total 
number  of 
case study 
interviews  
Number (%) of 
interviews 
citing staffing 
as a barrier 
 
Number (%) of 
interviews 
citing finances 
as a barrier 
 
Number (%) of 
interviews citing 
getting 
information 
from gov’t as a 
barrier 
 
Total number 
(%) of 
interviews 
citing an ability 
barrier 
Community A:  
UPK 
10 3 (30%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (30%) 
Community A:  
DSS 
6 1 (17%) 0 (0%) 3 (50%) 3 (50%) 
Community B:  
UPK 
5 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Community B:  
DSS 
6 1 (17%) 0 (0%) 1 (17%) 2 (33%) 
Community C:  
UPK 
6 4 (67%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 4 (67%) 
Community C:  
DSS 
6 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (17%) 1 (17%) 
Head Start 6 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Total 45 9 (20%) 0 (0%) 5 (11%) 13 (29%) 
 
As illustrated by Table 4, employees in thirteen interviews reported that their 
ability prevented them from properly completing the forms at least one time.  One of the 
primary ability barriers was inadequate staffing.  Among the nine interviews where 
staffing was a barrier, employees in seven interviews reported that their organizations 
lacked the staffing to complete the reporting forms properly at least one time.  Other job 
responsibilities sometimes took precedence over filling out the reporting forms.  For 
example, one contracted provider employee reported that her organization sometimes 
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couldn’t complete the UPK reporting forms on time because a teaching assistant would 
be absent.  This would mean that the classroom teacher had to cover for the teaching 
assistant in the classroom instead of completing the reporting forms.6  To quote another 
contracted provider employee:  “Childcare is extremely busy, and children come first. So 
if we need to take care of the kids, this is going to wait. That’s essentially what it is.” 
Consistent with reports that inadequate staffing was a barrier to proper form 
completion, employees in twenty-six of forty-five contracted provider interviews 
complained that completing the reporting forms were time consuming.  Comments such 
as the following were typical: “It's [filling out the reporting forms is] not complicated.  
It's just time consuming.”  It was not uncommon for contracted provider employees to 
report that their organizations spent five days or more days of staff time completing the 
reporting forms each time the forms were filled out.  Contracted provider employees in 
two interviews even expressed concern that completing the reporting forms compromised 
the overall quality of their programs.  In the words of one of these employees, “I feel like 
as though the district requires a lot of paperwork.  Sometimes it [filling out the reporting 
forms] takes away from the children because we’re so concerned with getting this done 
on time.”   These findings are consistent with other research that indicates government 
mandated paperwork can be time consuming and impose significant administrative 
burdens on front-line staff (GAO, 2003; Romzek & Johnston, 1999; Smith, 1996).   
The extent to which inadequate staffing was cited as a problem varied by 
programming area.  Five of the seven interviews where inadequate staffing was cited as 
resulting in improper form completion were with UPK contracted provider employees.  
                                                 
6 As early childhood programs, all contracted providers were required to adhere to state requirements 
regarding child-to-staff ratios. 
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In another three interviews, UPK contracted provider employees reported that while their 
organization had the ability to fill out the reporting form properly, doing it was difficult 
because of the burden placed on existing staff.  Only the former group of contracted 
provider employees was classified as experiencing an ability barrier in Table 4. 
UPK contracted provider employees did not report spending more time 
completing the reporting forms than employees from the other programming areas.  
Instead, differences in the type of staff completing the reporting forms may explain why 
UPK contracted provider employees were more likely to cite staffing as a problem.  
Administrative and other support staff was primarily responsible for completing the DSS 
and Head Start reporting forms.  Unlike classroom teachers, these staff did not have to 
worry about maintaining state mandated child-to-teacher ratios when completing the 
reporting forms.  On the other hand, classroom teachers primarily completed the UPK 
forms and had to juggle reporting responsibilities with their normal classroom activities.   
Two other staffing barriers were mentioned by contracted provider employees.  
According to employees in two interviews, staff turnover prevented their organizations at 
least once from completing the reporting forms on time.  Another employee indicated that 
lack of training on filling out the reporting forms hindered her from completing them 
accurately and completely.  However, overall lack of staff training does not appear to be 
a barrier to proper form completion.  This may be because most contracted providers 
indicated that the reporting forms were not very complicated to complete.  Perhaps if the 
reporting forms studied had been more complicated to complete, there might have been a 
stronger link between training and staff capacity to properly complete the forms.  In 
addition, lack of adequate financial resources does not appear to be preventing proper 
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form completion as none of the contracted provider employees interviewed cited this as a 
barrier as illustrated in Table 4.   
    As depicted in Table 4, the other ability barrier cited by several contracted 
provider employees was difficulty obtaining information from the government.  DSS 
contracted provider employees in five of eighteen interviews reported that their reporting 
forms sometimes did not match DSS records because they had not obtained the 
information from DSS government employees that they needed to complete the reporting 
forms accurately.  For example, DSS contracted provider employees in three interviews 
reported instances in which a child’s subsidy was terminated but claimed DSS 
government employees never notified them that the child had been terminated.  As a 
result, contracted providers had continued to provide child care to children who were no 
longer authorized to receive DSS subsidies.   As explained by one of these employees: 
What’s frustrating about it [the reporting forms] is the children come and  
go, and they lose funding [for their child care subsidy.]  And you don’t always 
know when they’ve lost the funding....You ask them [DSS government 
employees] why [they did not provide reimbursement for a particular child’s 
services] and [the DSS government employees respond] “Oh, the funding 
stopped.”  Well, when were you going to tell us? 
 
None of the UPK or Head Start contracted provider employees identified difficulty 
obtaining information from the government as a barrier.  This variation by programming 
area is likely due to the type of information required on the different forms.  DSS 
contracted provider employees needed to obtain accurate information from the 
government in order to properly complete their reporting forms.  On the other hand, UPK 
and Head Start employees could obtain the information they needed to complete their 
forms without coordinating with the government.  
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Understanding as a Barrier to Proper Tool Use 
In addition to examining motivation and ability barriers to proper tool use, this 
study explored the prevalence of understanding barriers.  Table 5 lists the number of 
interviews broken down by case study in which contracted provider employees indicated 
experiencing specific understanding problems.  The first type of understanding problem 
involves instances where the contracted provider’s understanding of proper form 
completion did not match the instructions they were shown  and this misunderstanding 
would have impacted form accuracy, completeness, and/or timeliness.  The second 
involves instances where the contracted provider employee indicated that she was 
confused about some aspect of form completion and this confusion had not been 
resolved.  The third involves instances where confusion about form completion had been 
resolved.  The last column lists the total number of interviews in which at least one 
understanding problem was mentioned.  This column is not a sum of the other three 
because some people mentioned more than one type of understanding problem. 
Table 5.  Understanding as a Barrier 
 
Case study  
 
Total 
number of 
case study 
interviews 
Number (%) of 
interviews which 
indicated 
understanding 
did not match 
instructions 
Number (%) of 
interviews 
which indicated 
there was 
unresolved 
confusion  
Number (%) of 
interviews 
which indicated 
there was 
resolved 
confusion  
Total number 
(%) of 
interviews citing 
an understanding 
problem 
Community A:  
UPK 
10 1 (10%) 1 (10%) 2 (20%) 3 (30%) 
Community A:  
DSS 
6 5 (83%) 4 (67%) 0 (0%) 5 (83%) 
Community B:  
UPK 
5 1 (20%) 0 (0%) 1 (20%) 1 (20%) 
Community B:  
DSS 
6 5 (83%) 0 (0%) 1 (17%) 5 (83%) 
Community C:  
UPK 
6 1 (17%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (17%) 
Community C:  
DSS 
6 0 (0%) 1 (17%) 1 (17%) 2 (33%) 
Head Start 6 1 (17%) 0 (0%) 2 (33%) 3 (50%) 
Total 45 14 (31%) 6 (13%) 7 (16%) 20 (44%) 
 22
Like ability, problems relating to differing understandings were reported as a 
moderate barrier to proper form completion.  In twenty of the forty-five contracted 
provider interviews, employees indicated that there was some understanding problem 
regarding form completion.  As illustrated by Table 5, understanding problems were 
particularly common with the DSS programs in Communities A and B.  In both case 
studies, employees in five of the six contracted provider interviews reported 
understanding problems.  For example in Community A, employees in three interviews 
indicated that they did not always understand the system DSS used to calculate their 
reimbursements and that the formula that DSS used did not seem to be consistent.While 
less widespread than the understanding problems associated with the DSS programs in 
Communities A and B, understanding still appeared to be a moderate problem for the 
Head Start program. The reported understanding problems associated with the remaining 
programs were relatively minor.  In each of these cases, understanding problems were 
reported in one-third or less of the interviews.   
Table 6.  Strength of Technical Assistance Systems for Using Forms  
 
Case Study  
 
Training when 
forms introduced 
Ongoing meetings 
on forms 
Written 
instructions on 
form completion 
Accessible 
technical 
assistance 
Major issue     
Community A:  DSS x  x  
Community B:  DSS   x  
Moderate issue     
Head Start x x x  
Minor issue     
Community C:  DSS x x x  
Community A:  UPK x x x (some forms) x 
Community B:  UPK       n/a 
Community C:  UPK x x x (some forms) x 
 
There is some evidence suggesting a link between the overall strength of technical 
assistance systems and understanding problems.  Table 6 compares the strength of the 
technical assistance system for the reporting forms with the extent of understanding 
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problems by case study.  For each case study, understanding problems were classified as:  
(1) a major issue if understanding problems were reported in two-thirds or more of the 
interviews, (2) a moderate issue if understanding problems were reported in more than 
one-third but less than two-thirds of the interviews, and (3) a minor issue if understanding 
problems were reported in one-third or less of the interviews.   
As depicted by Table 6, understanding problems tended to only be a minor or 
moderate issue for programs with stronger technical assistance systems.  In contrast, 
understanding problems tended to be a more significant issue for programs with weaker 
technical assistance systems.  One characteristic of strong technical assistance systems 
that appears to be particularly important in reducing understanding problems is the 
government’s organization of ongoing meetings on the reporting forms.  The government 
organized ongoing meetings on the reporting forms with contracted providers in four of 
the five case studies with minimal or moderate understanding problems.   
Programs with weaker technical assistance systems tended to have more pervasive 
understanding problems.  The DSS programs in Communities A and B, the two programs 
with the most widespread understanding problems, each lacked at least two elements 
indicative of strong technical assistance systems.  The technical assistance tended to be 
reactive rather than proactive with contracted providers typically contacting the 
government when they had a reporting concern.  In addition, employees in both 
communities reported difficulty accessing the limited technical assistance that was 
available.  As a vivid example, DSS contracted providers in Community A were only 
allowed to call with questions concerning the forms after 2pm.  Representative of views 
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expressed by contracted providers in both communities, one employee commented:  “We 
feel like we have to hunt the [DSS government] workers down.”   
Community B’s UPK program is the one outlier contradicting the link between 
the overall strength of technical assistance systems and understanding problems.  As 
illustrated by Table 6, the technical assistance system for this program was extremely 
weak but there were also relatively few understanding problems.  One reason for this may 
be that some UPK contracted providers in Community B helped design the reporting 
forms they were required to complete.  In additon, there appears to have been almost no 
communication between the school district and UPK contracted providers regarding the 
forms once they were developed according to employees in all five of the UPK 
contracted provider interviews.  To quote one of these employees, “There is no feedback 
with this program.  None.”  This lack of feedback may have made it more difficult to 
identify confusion regarding differing expectations about form completion.     
Discussion and Conclusion  
 
The role of government is gradually shifting from service deliverer to contract 
manager because of contracting out.  As a result, government needs to become better 
adept at contract management.  It is unfortunate but the reality is government often lacks 
the internal capacity to monitor contracted providers so it has to rely on other 
mechanisms like service monitoring tools.  Given this, having a better understanding of 
the role service monitoring tools play in the contract monitoring process is important.   
This paper identifies different barriers that contracted providers perceive as 
preventing them from using service monitoring tools properly.  It finds that ability was 
perceived as a moderate barrier.  Employees in more than a quarter of the contracted 
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provider interviews reported that their ability prevented them from properly completing 
the forms on at least one occasion.  Key ability barriers include inadequate staffing and 
difficulty obtaining needed information from the government.  Understanding problems 
were also perceived as a moderate barrier to proper form completion.  In nearly half of 
the contracted provider interviews, employees indicated that there was some problem 
regarding understanding on how the reporting forms should have been completed.   On 
the other hand, motivation was not perceived as a barrier to proper tool use.   
This study’s research design offers some important advantages.  By conducting 
interviews, it was possible to collect rich data on a complicated issue.  Using an interview 
format also may have made it easier to discuss sensitive issues involved with contracted 
providers’ use of service monitoring tools because the researcher could personally 
guarantee informants’ confidentiality.  While there are some benefits to this study’s 
research design, there are some limitations.  The finding that motivation was not 
perceived as a barrier to proper tool use may be the result of social desirability bias.  The 
contracted provider employees may have felt more comfortable blaming reporting form 
problems on structural and personnel issues rather than on more intrinsic qualities like 
motivation.  Another limitation of this research is that only the author of this study coded 
its data.  This raises concerns about the reliability of the study’s findings.  Although inter-
rater reliability was not established, detailed definitions for each code were developed as 
a strategy for ensuring consistent usage.  In addition, the generalizability of this study’s 
findings to other geographic areas and other service areas may be limited.  Concerns 
about external validity were somewhat minimized by conducting research in three 
communities instead of one and by conducting multiple case studies at each research site.   
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What are the implications of this research for public administrators?   By being 
realistic about the reporting requirements it imposes on contracted providers, government 
can reduce the likelihood that inadequate staffing will be a barrier to proper tool use.  The 
government is contracting with contracted providers to deliver a service.  Many of the 
individuals who are completing reporting forms are also directly involved in service 
delivery so they must juggle several different job responsibilities.  There is a trade-off 
between accountability and service delivery when front-line staff is responsible for both 
of these functions.  The more time front-line staff spends on accountability functions, the 
less time they will have to focus on service delivery.  If excessive, reporting requirements 
may actually undermine service delivery goals.  Government should consider who will be 
primarily filling out the reporting forms and what their other job responsibilities are when 
evaluating the feasibility of reporting requirements.  The other primary barrier limiting 
contracted provider ability was difficulty obtaining information from the government.  
This finding suggests government could increase the likelihood that contracted providers 
will have the ability necessary to properly fill out reporting forms by having good 
communication between government and contracted provider employees.   
This study finds wide variation in the technical assistance systems for different 
service monitoring tools and some evidence suggesting a link between the overall 
strength of technical assistance systems and understanding problems.  One characteristic 
of strong technical assistance systems that appears to be particularly important in 
reducing understanding problems is the government’s organization of ongoing meetings 
on the reporting forms.   Making up-front investments in technical assistance may result 
in public resources being used more efficiently in the long run.  It will reduce the amount 
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of time public administrators will have to spend resolving misunderstandings about how 
reporting forms should have been completed and “cleaning up” the inaccurate and 
incomplete data contracted providers have submitted.  Moreover, government employees 
will have more time to devote to their other job responsibilities.  Providing ongoing 
technical assistance is likely to be particularly important in service areas where there is a 
lot of contracted provider staff turnover.  Future research should further explore the link 
between technical assistance systems and understanding problems.  In addition, future 
research should examine the underlying causes of variation in the technical assistance 
systems for service monitoring tools.  Why do some governments choose to make 
substantial investments of time and energy in their technical assistance systems and other 
governments do not?  Moreover, are these investment decisions by governments a 
reflection of the overall emphasis placed in their contract monitoring systems?   
Also significant is what this paper did not find:  motivation was not perceived as a 
barrier to proper tool use.  This paper focused on reporting forms in one service area, 
early childhood programming, in order to minimize the potential for confounding factors.   
One thing that would be interesting to explore in future research is whether motivation 
might be a greater barrier to proper tool in other service areas.  For example, the findings 
of this study might have been very different if case studies were conducted on a service 
area that was dominated by for-profit organizations.  All but three of the contracted 
providers participating in this study were either public or non-profit organizations.  Both 
of these types of organizations tend to emphasize public service values and goals.  Thus, 
government may be able minimize concerns about adverse selection and moral hazard 
typically associated with principal-agent relationships by contracting with public and/or 
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non-profit organizations.  On the other hand, for-profit contracted providers may be more 
prone to opportunistic behavior due to this sector’s emphasis on maximizing profits.  If 
the majority of contracted providers had been for-profit organizations, perhaps lack of 
motivation might have been a greater barrier to proper tool use. 
Minimizing barriers to proper tool usage is ultimately in the best interests of 
public administrators and the citizens they serve.   Public administrators’ contract 
management decisions are only as good as the information used to make these decisions.  
The lack of accurate, complete, and timely information on the services contracted 
providers have delivered compromises public administrators’ ability to effectively 
monitor contracted providers and hold contracted providers accountable.  Given the 
prevalence of contracting out, contract monitoring and contracted providers’ use of 
service monitoring tools are likely to continue to be significant public administration 
issues for many years to come.   
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